Estate of Eleanor R. Gerson, Deceased, Allan D. Kleinman, Executor - Page 62

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               The Internal Revenue Code contains numerous specific                   
          delegations of authority from Congress to the Secretary or the              
          Commissioner to issue rules or regulations that have the force              
          and effect of law.  See, e.g., sec. 1502.  These sections--that             
          provide for issuing legislative regulations--would be superfluous           
          if section 7805 were a delegation of authority from Congress to             
          make rules or regulations carrying the force of law.  It is a               
          fundamental rule of statutory construction to give effect to all            
          of the language of the statute.  See Hellmich v. Hellman, 276               
          U.S. 233 (1928); Stanford v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 298, 308 (9th           
          Cir. 1961), affg. 34 T.C. 1150 (1960); Larkin v. United States,             
          78 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1935); Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345             
          (1963), affd. per curiam 326 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1964).  It is a              
          well-accepted rule of statutory construction that the various               
          sections of the Code should be construed so that one section will           
          explain and support and not defeat or destroy another section.              
          Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 13 (1947); Bernier v. Bernier,           
          147 U.S. 242, 246 (1893); Pleasanton Gravel Co. v. Commissioner,            
          85 T.C. 839, 851 (1985).  Accordingly, I believe that section               
          7805 is not a delegation of authority by Congress to make rules             
          or regulations carrying the force of law.                                   
          IV. Mead Applied to Interpretive Regulations                                
               Prior to Mead, we questioned whether Chevron applies to                
          interpretive regulations.  Cent. Pa. Sav. Association & Subs. v.            
          Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 391 (1995) (citing E.I. duPont de               




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