Estate of Eleanor R. Gerson, Deceased, Allan D. Kleinman, Executor - Page 51

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          predicated on its finding that respondent’s interpretation is “a            
          reasonable * * * interpretation of the plain language” of TRA               
          1986 section 1433(b)(2)(A), as opposed to a finding, which the              
          Court’s opinion does not make, that respondent’s interpretation             
          represents the plain reading of TRA 1986 section 1433(b)(2)(A).             
          To my mind, an unambiguous statute has only a single plain                  
          reading, see Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94             
          (2001), and any other reading is ultra vires even if it is                  
          “reasonable”.2  Such is especially so where, as here, respondent’s          

               2 I disagree with the Court’s opinion’s conclusion supra pp.           
          24-25 that “Congress has [not] directly spoken to the precise               
          question at issue” “Inasmuch as TRA 1986 section 1433(b)(2)(A)              
          does not define the phrase ‘transfer under a trust’”.  Congress             
          has spoken directly on this issue in the best way that it can;              
          i.e., by providing in unambiguous terms that the generation-                
          skipping tax (GST) “shall not apply to * * * any generation-                
          skipping transfer under a trust which was irrevocable on                    
          September 25, 1985”.  TRA 1986 sec. 1433(b)(2)(A) (emphasis                 
          added); see HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (“As we have            
          explained, ‘the word “any” has an expansive meaning, that is,               
          “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind’” (quoting United            
          States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997))); United States v. Am.            
          Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is,           
          of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a                  
          statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give           
          expression to its wishes.”); see also United States v. Monsanto,            
          491 U.S. 600, 606-609 (1989); D.J. Lee, M.D., Inc. v.                       
          Commissioner, 931 F.2d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1991), affg. 92 T.C.              
          291 (1989); Cornett-Lewis Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d                
          1000, 1004 (6th Cir. 1944), revg. and remanding 47 B.T.A. 571               
          (1942).  I know no rule of law, nor has the Court’s opinion                 
          referenced any such rule, that states that a term is ambiguous              
          simply because it is not defined by Congress.  The Supreme Court            
          has “stated time and again that courts must presume that a                  
          legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a                  
          statute what it says there.  * * *  When the statutory language             
          is plain, the sole function of the courts--at least where the               
                                                              (continued...)          





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