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VASQUEZ, J., dissenting: I write separately to address the
issue of the proper deference the Court should give to
interpretive regulations.1 I respectfully disagree with the
position that when the Court reviews interpretive regulations we
should continue to follow the analysis set forth in Natl. Muffler
Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). See
Court op. pp. 22-23. I believe that in United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court of the United
States set forth the analysis that courts should use to decide
the deference courts should give to interpretive regulations.
I. Chevron Deference
“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843
(1984). Accordingly, an agency interpretation (e.g., a Treasury
regulation) cannot conflict with the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.
If a statute is ambiguous, Chevron provides that a reviewing
court is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has
not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable. United States v. Mead Corp., supra
at 227, 229. Thus, any regulation entitled to Chevron deference
1 Deference only sets the framework for judicial analysis;
it does not displace it. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S.
546, 550 (1973).
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