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Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1994), affg.
102 T.C. 1 (1994)). The Supreme Court, also prior to issuing
Mead, held that interpretive regulations are owed “less deference
than a regulation issued under a specific grant of authority to
define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a
statutory provision”. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247,
253 (1981); see United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S.
16, 24 (1982) (quoting Rowan Cos.); see also Cent. Pa. Sav.
Association v. Commissioner, supra at 391 (citing Vogel
Fertilizer Co.). Accordingly, what level of deference the Court
should give to interpretive regulations needs to be reexamined in
light of Mead.
The first question in the Mead analysis is whether Congress
delegated authority to the agency to make rules or regulations
carrying the force and effect of law. United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-227; Pool Co. v. Cooper, supra at 177 n.3.
The second question is whether the agency invoked that authority.
United States v. Mead Corp., supra; Pool Co. v. Cooper, supra.
By promulgating a regulation pursuant to section 7805, the
regulation was not issued pursuant to a delegation of authority
by Congress to make rules or regulations carrying the force and
effect of law. See Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at
7; Matheson v. Commissioner, supra at 840 n.7. Accordingly,
pursuant to Mead, interpretive regulations are not entitled to
Chevron deference; instead, they are entitled to Skidmore
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