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deference. United States v. Mead Corp., supra at 234-235; Rowan
Cos. v. United States, supra at 253; United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., supra at 24; Pool Co. v. Cooper, supra at 177;
Cent. Pa. Sav. Association v. Commissioner, supra at 391; Klamath
Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608,
621 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (discussing the differences between
legislative and interpretive regulations, concluding that
different standards of review apply to each and that courts must
accord a higher degree of deference to a legislative regulation
than to an interpretive regulation, and holding that “Chevron
deference is only available to the Regulation if it is a
legislative regulation.”); see also Boeing Co. v. United States,
537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003) (noting that an interpretive regulation
promulgated under section 7805 “rather than pursuant to a
specific grant of authority” is entitled to some measure of
deference; however, the Court did not hold or suggest that
interpretive regulations should receive Chevron deference).
V. Conclusion
I believe that Mead changed the landscape regarding the
deference courts should give to interpretive regulations.
Pursuant to the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Mead,
I believe interpretive regulations are entitled to Skidmore
deference.
Accordingly, I dissent.
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