Jean-Remy Facq and Jennifer Huff-Facq - Page 21

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          second opinion.  See id. (such a requirement would nullify the              
          purpose of seeking the advice of an expert in the first place).             
          Furthermore, the cases on whether a taxpayer realized gain on the           
          stock purchased with third-party margin debt had yet to be                  
          litigated at the time petitioners filed the return for 2000.                
          There was therefore no definitive authority to guide petitioners            
          on whether they could exclude approximately $16.9 million of gain           
          from stock acquired with third-party margin debt.  Because the              
          issue, at the time they filed their return, was novel, we find              
          that petitioners had reasonable cause and acted in good faith in            
          excluding the gain when they filed their return.  See Williams v.           
          Commissioner, 123 T.C. 144 (2004) (declining to impose a penalty            
          involving issue of first impression and the interrelationship               
          between complex tax and bankruptcy laws).  We do not find                   
          subsequent adverse caselaw to be relevant in considering whether            
          petitioners had reasonable cause and acted in good faith with               
          respect to the understatement when they filed their return.15               
               We find, therefore, that petitioners have carried their                
          burden that they had reasonable cause and acted in good faith to            





               15The mere fact that we held against petitioners on the                
          substantive issue does not, in and of itself, require holding for           
          respondent on the penalty.  See Hitchins v. Commissioner, 103               
          T.C. 711, 719-720 (1994) (“Indeed, we have specifically refused             
          to impose * * * [a penalty] where it appeared that the issue was            
          one not previously considered by the Court and the statutory                
          language was not entirely clear.”).                                         




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