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at 278; United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. at 55. Accordingly,
whether property can be reached by application of the Federal tax
lien statute depends on what rights the taxpayer has in the
property under State law. United States v. Craft, supra at 278.
Petitioner counters that the “notwithstanding” provision of
section 6015(g) takes precedence over all other statutes, laws,
and rules of law that would conflict with or restrict a refund or
credit.
The phrase “notwithstanding any other law or rule of law”
should not always be read literally. Or. Natural Res. Council v.
Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 796-797 (9th Cir. 1996); E.P. Paup Co. v.
Director, OWCP, 999 F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1993); Kee Leasing
Co. v. McGahan (In re Glacier Bay), 944 F.2d 577, 582 (9th Cir.
1991); Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exchange, Inc., 828 F.2d
586, 588-589 (9th Cir. 1987). If read literally here, the phrase
could be applied to avoid all State law property ownership
provisions in both common law and community property States, thus
creating an absence of law to define the ownership of the
payments for purposes of the section 6015(g) refund jurisdiction.
Even if limited to community property provisions, petitioner’s
position leaves us with no law or resource to define the
ownership of the payments made from 1985 until 2003 on the tax
liabilities for the years at issue.
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