- 16 -
At this point, an excerpt from Powell v. Commissioner, 101
T.C. at 494, is especially apt:
Another significant ingredient is reflected in the
judicial attitude in respect of the interplay between
Federal laws and State community property laws. This
attitude is set forth in the following statement by the
Supreme Court in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587
(1989):
Because domestic relations are preeminently
matters of state law, we have consistently
recognized that Congress, when it passes
general legislation, rarely intends to
displace state authority in this area. See,
e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 628 (1987);
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979). Thus we have held that we will not
find pre-emption absent evidence that it is
“‘positively required by direct enactment’”.
Hisquierdo, supra, at 581 (quoting Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)). The instant
case, however, presents one of those rare
instances where Congress has directly and
specifically legislated in the area of
domestic relations. [Emphasis supplied.]
In light of the foregoing approach, the Supreme
Court has decreed that Federal law supplants community
property law only where the congressional intent to
accomplish such a result is clear and unequivocal.
Mansell v. Mansell, supra (military retirement pay and
veterans’ disability benefits); McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210 (1981) (military retirement pay); Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (railroad retirement
benefits); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950)
(deceased army officer’s life insurance); In re
Marriage of Hillerman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App.
1980) (Social Security benefits). * * *
In addressing the question of whether there is “clear and
unequivocal” congressional intent to supplant established
reference to State law, the legislative history of the
predecessor of section 6015(g) and the wording of the refund
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