Wechsler & Co., Inc. - Page 54

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         shareholder had a definite conflict of interest).11  This factor             
         strongly supports respondent.                                                
              E.  Internal Consistency in Compensation                                
              This factor focuses on whether the compensation was paid                
         pursuant to a structured, formal, and consistently applied                   
         program.  Bonuses not paid pursuant to such plans are suspect.               
         Similarly, bonuses paid to controlling shareholders are also                 
         suspect “if, when compared to salaries paid non-owner management,            
         they indicate that the level of compensation is a function of                
         ownership, not corporate management responsibility.”  Elliotts,              
         Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d at 1247; see also Rapco, Inc. v.              
         Commissioner, 85 F.3d at 954.                                                

               11  On brief, petitioner argues that Mr. Wechsler’s                    
          compensation for most of the years in issue should be considered            
          reasonable because three other unrelated shareholders in                    
          petitioner--Mr. Glickman, Mr. Zeeman, and Mr. Solomon--                     
          purportedly approved that compensation.  Petitioner’s reliance              
          upon Mr. Glickman’s, Mr. Zeeman’s and Mr. Solomon’s alleged                 
          approval of the compensation petitioner paid Mr. Wechsler,                  
          however, is misplaced.  Mr. Wechsler was petitioner’s controlling           
          shareholder and owned a majority of its common shares sufficient            
          to elect a majority of petitioner’s directors.  In contrast, Mr.            
          Glickman, Mr. Zeeman, and Mr. Solomon (who were also full-time              
          employees and officers of petitioner) owned small minority stock            
          interests in petitioner.  Their continued employment was subject            
          to Mr. Wechsler’s authority.  Mr. Glickman, Mr. Zeeman, and Mr.             
          Solomon thus cannot substitute for the inactive, hypothetical               
          independent investor under the independent investor test adopted            
          by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and other courts.            
          See Rapco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 950, 954-955 (2d Cir.              
          1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-128; Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner,           
          716 F.2d 1241, 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1983), revg. T.C. Memo. 1980-           
          282; Haffner’s Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.             
          2002-38, affd. 326 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003).                                  






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