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696, 697 (Tex. App. 1992). The presumption is rebuttable by
clear and convincing evidence. Richardson v. Laney, supra at
492; Masterson v. Hogue, supra at 697; Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d
194, 197 (Tex. App. 1992).
Although research has not revealed any Texas cases directly
addressing the propriety of using this presumption in the context
of joint account matters controlled by TPC 438(a) and related
provisions, the Court for the sake of argument will assume its
potential applicability here. Accordingly, we consider the
sufficiency of the evidence offered by respondent to overcome any
presumption of donative intent.
In contrast to the weak and suspect nature of the
circumstances relied upon by the estate in an attempt to show
donative intent, as discussed above, the more objective evidence
in the record leans strongly in the opposite direction. As
alluded to previously, one of the most salient facts here is that
within days of each relevant sale of eConnect shares, decedent
wired the proceeds out of the joint account. The March 16, 2000,
transfer of $2,909,593.56 into a personal account at AmSouth Bank
is particularly revealing. Moreover, none of the investment
accounts in which the proceeds subsequently came to rest is
purported to be any type of joint account over which Mr. Greene
possessed even formal authority. Such actions are nearly
impossible to reconcile with the idea of shares’ having been
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