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3. Time of the Hearing
Industrial claims that Talbott’s unilateral scheduling of a
telephone conference was a third abuse of discretion. However,
Industrial didn’t raise this issue in its petition to this Court
and, under Rule 331(b)(4), the issue is therefore deemed to be
conceded. Industrial did raise a related issue which we feel
should be mentioned: it argued that the Commissioner erred by not
permitting sufficient time to present evidence in support of
Industrial’s offer-in-compromise. This is not a problem that
lends itself to bright lines, and will presumably be fixed on
remand. We merely note that eighteen business days from the date
of initial contact hardly seems an adequate amount of time for a
corporation to provide all relevant documentation, and putting
Industrial into default when Wells left word that he was under
subpoena to appear in court is inexplicable.
4. Evidence of Industrial’s Settlement Agreement
The final argument that we discuss is Industrial’s
contention that Talbott failed to consider evidence of the
settlement between Industrial and the IRS. Talbott refused to
review the documents because he regarded them as an attempt by
Industrial to challenge its underlying tax liability. But it
wasn’t: When a taxpayer argues that the assessed amount doesn’t
accurately reflect a settlement, judgment, or decision, he isn’t
challenging his liability--he’s challenging the accuracy of the
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