- 7 -
992 F.2d 1132, 1135-1136 (11th Cir. 1993), affg. 94 T.C. 126
(1990); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820
F.2d 1543, 1547 (9th Cir. 1987), affg. T.C. Memo. 1986-23;
Clendenen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-32, affd. 345 F.3d 568
(8th Cir. 2003).
Given the importance of the stipulation process to this
Court, our reluctance to relieve a party of a stipulation it
negotiated and executed is understandable. Permitting challenges
to otherwise binding stipulations of fact undermines the
stipulation process and injects uncertainty into our litigation
process, often after the record is closed. See, e.g., La. Land &
Exploration Co. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 630, 649 (1988); Logsdon
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-8 (relief from stipulation
denied where the taxpayer sought to introduce evidence not in the
record to support his motion and the Commissioner would be
prejudiced by the lack of opportunity to develop the stipulated
position at trial); Grasso v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-479
(relief from stipulation denied when taxpayer contended for the
first time in his posttrial brief that he mistakenly agreed to
the stipulation). Although we have discretion to modify or set
aside a stipulation of fact that is clearly contrary to the facts
established by the record, Cal-Maine Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 181, 195 (1989), we do not set aside a stipulation of
fact that is consistent with the record simply because one party
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011