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Respondent, this should not be a basis for relief for
Respondent, because at most, stipulation[s] 22 and 34
are applications of law to fact, which is expressly
permitted under Tax Court Rule 91(a).
The truth of petitioners’ statement can be seen by examining the
disputed stipulations.
Stipulation 22 provides that “Neither the Petitioner nor
Doyle V. Mathia, deceased, was a notice partner in Greenwich or a
member of a notice group as described in I.R.C. �6223(b)(2).”
Stipulation 34 provides that “At all times relevant to the
pending matter, Smith possessed the authority to bind both
Greenwich and all of its partners, including Doyle V. Mathia,
deceased, to a settlement agreement with the Respondent.”
Implicit in each of the stipulations is a set of facts and the
application of law to those facts. Stipulation 22 refers to
“notice partner” and “notice group”, two terms that are defined
by sections 6231(a)(8) and 6223(b)(2), respectively. Section
6231(a)(8) defines a notice partner as “a partner who, at the
time in question, would be entitled to notice under subsection
(a) of section 6223 (determined without regard to subsections
(b)(2) and (e)(1)(B) thereof).” Section 6223 provides the rules
governing when and how notices of the beginning and completion of
administrative partnership-level proceedings must be given by the
Secretary to the partners. Section 6223(b) provides a special
notice rule for partnerships with more than 100 partners.
Section 6223(b)(2) requires the Secretary to give the notice
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