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considerable time and effort developing and presenting evidence
on the issue of whether Mr. Mathia was bound by the TMP’s
execution of the Greenwich settlement. Resetting this case for
trial would prejudice petitioners, see Stamm Intl. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315, 321 (1988), who would be forced to
prepare for trial and litigate factual issues resolved in the
Stipulation, see Korangy v. Commissioner, supra. Such a
substantial change in the procedural setting of this case would
burden this Court’s resources and those of the parties. See id.
“‘These unnecessary burdens on the system are unreasonable and
unfair from the standpoint of everyone involved.’” Id. (quoting
Brooks v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 413, 430 (1984), affd. without
published opinion 772 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1985)).
It is reasonable to assume that respondent had or could have
had access to his administrative file before he entered into the
disputed stipulations and that respondent had or should have had
all of the necessary facts to determine whether petitioners were
bound by the Greenwich settlement between the TMP and the
Commissioner in the Greenwich litigation before he entered into
the disputed stipulations. See Tate & Lyle, Inc. & Subs. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-80, revd. on other grounds 87 F.3d
99 (3d Cir. 1996). Respondent has not alleged any exceptional
circumstances in this case justifying respondent’s sudden change
in position and explaining why respondent did not conduct a
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