- 6 -
See, e.g., Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th Cir.
1983), affg. T.C. Memo. 1981-1; Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d
358 (4th Cir. 1965), affg. 43 T.C. 50 (1964); Tomlinson v.
Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964); DiLeo v. Commissioner,
96 T.C. 858, 885-886 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992);
Arctic Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 68 (1964); cf.
Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st Cir. 1966)
(improper inducement of defendant’s waiver of right to appeal
criminal judgment tainted the judgment’s finality for collateral
estoppel purposes), affg. in part and vacating in part T.C. Memo.
1965-199.
Petitioner cites no judicial precedent to the contrary;
rather, he acknowledges, in understated fashion, that the
judicial precedents are “fairly well settled” in this regard.
Furthermore, petitioner acknowledges that “Normally, the
sentencing guideline determination of a District Court that
accepts a section 7201 plea will have no bearing on the outcome
of a civil fraud penalty case under I.R.C. section 6663”.
Petitioner suggests, however, that the application of collateral
estoppel against him is inappropriate in this proceeding because
the downward departure from the imprisonment guideline in his
criminal proceeding “implies” that the District Court and U.S.
attorney found it “appropriate and necessary substantially to
mitigate the severity of the criminal penalties that would have
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