- 8 -
States, 360 F.2d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 1965). Hence, the criminal
conviction necessarily established the requisite wrongful intent
for purposes of the civil sanction. Amos v. Commissioner, supra;
see also Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, supra at 265.
Under well-established judicial precedents, for purposes of
applying collateral estoppel, it is immaterial that petitioner’s
conviction resulted from a plea of guilty to the criminal charges
brought against him rather than from a trial on the merits after
a plea of not guilty. “A guilty plea is as much a conviction as
a conviction following jury trial.” Gray v. Commissioner, supra
at 246. A guilty plea constitutes an admission of all the
elements of the criminal charge. McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466 (1969). “Once accepted by a court, it is the
voluntary plea of guilt itself, with its intrinsic admission of
each element of the crime, that triggers the collateral
consequences attending that plea.” Blohm v. Commissioner, 994
F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1991-636; see
Manzoli v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 101, 105 (1st Cir. 1990), affg.
T.C. Memo. 1989-49 and T.C. Memo. 1988-299; Ivers v. United
States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978); Brazzell v. Adams,
493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465
F.2d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 1972), affg. T.C. Memo. 1970-274; Metros
v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313, 317 (10th Cir. 1970); DiLeo v.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Next
Last modified: March 27, 2008