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Commissioner, supra at 885; Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213
(1971).
Petitioner urges us to depart from these well-established
judicial precedents because of “practical exigencies” that he
contends induced him to enter the plea agreement. Petitioner
suggests that he was induced to enter the guilty plea because the
Government agreed to stipulate for purposes of sentencing that
petitioner suffered from a diminished mental capacity. Moreover,
petitioner suggests, in deciding to enter the guilty plea, he was
influenced by his assessment of the operation of the Insanity
Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. section 17(a) (2000).4 He asserts
that this provision would have precluded him from mounting a
“full scale ‘diminished capacity’ defense” in the criminal
proceeding even though he “might have been able to introduce some
evidence relating to his mental condition”.5
4 The Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 17(a)
(2000), provides:
Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a
prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant,
as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense.
5 Petitioner suggests that the United States agreed to
accept the guilty plea because of concerns about petitioner’s
mental health. Although petitioner does not raise this point,
the record also suggests that the United States accepted the
(continued...)
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