Carmelo Montalbano - Page 10
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Petitioner does not suggest, however, that the plea
agreement was wrongfully induced or that there was otherwise any
irregularity or unfairness in the criminal proceeding leading to
the guilty plea. To the contrary, petitioner states that he “has
no desire to disavow the guilty plea--it is a fact--in this
case.” Moreover, petitioner does not dispute that he in fact
committed the offense charged in the criminal proceeding.
Petitioner’s explanations as to why he and the Government
entered the plea agreement are irrelevant under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. See Manzoli v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1989-94, affd. 904 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Blohm v.
Commissioner, supra at 1555-1556; Stone v. Commissioner, supra at
221; Boettner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-359; Hull v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-577. Moreover, we reject any
suggestion that collateral estoppel is inappropriate because
petitioner’s purported “diminished capacity” defense was
purportedly restricted by the Insanity Defense Reform Act in the
criminal proceeding. For the reasons previously discussed,
petitioner’s criminal conviction necessarily established that he
had the requisite wrongful intent, and hence the requisite mental
capacity, for imposition of the civil fraud penalty. To conclude
otherwise would be to assume, contrary to basic principles, that
guilty plea partly because petitioner agreed to assist the
Government in the criminal prosecution of other parties.
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Last modified: March 27, 2008