- 10 - Petitioner does not suggest, however, that the plea agreement was wrongfully induced or that there was otherwise any irregularity or unfairness in the criminal proceeding leading to the guilty plea. To the contrary, petitioner states that he “has no desire to disavow the guilty plea--it is a fact--in this case.” Moreover, petitioner does not dispute that he in fact committed the offense charged in the criminal proceeding. Petitioner’s explanations as to why he and the Government entered the plea agreement are irrelevant under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Manzoli v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-94, affd. 904 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Blohm v. Commissioner, supra at 1555-1556; Stone v. Commissioner, supra at 221; Boettner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-359; Hull v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-577. Moreover, we reject any suggestion that collateral estoppel is inappropriate because petitioner’s purported “diminished capacity” defense was purportedly restricted by the Insanity Defense Reform Act in the criminal proceeding. For the reasons previously discussed, petitioner’s criminal conviction necessarily established that he had the requisite wrongful intent, and hence the requisite mental capacity, for imposition of the civil fraud penalty. To conclude otherwise would be to assume, contrary to basic principles, that 5(...continued) guilty plea partly because petitioner agreed to assist the Government in the criminal prosecution of other parties.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 NextLast modified: March 27, 2008