- 20 -
Second, petitioners argue that public policy demands that
their offer-in-compromise be accepted because they were victims
of fraud. We disagree. While the regulations do not set forth a
specific standard for evaluating an offer-in-compromise based on
claims of public policy or equity, the regulations contain two
illustrative examples. See sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3)(iv), Examples
(1) and (2), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The first example describes
a taxpayer who is seriously ill and unable to file income tax
returns for several years. The second example describes a
taxpayer who received erroneous advice from the Commissioner as
to the tax effect of the taxpayer’s actions. Neither example
bears any resemblance to this case. See Speltz v. Commissioner,
454 F.3d at 786. Unlike the exceptional circumstances
exemplified in the regulations, petitioners’ situation is neither
unique nor exceptional in that petitioners’ situation mirrors
that of numerous taxpayers who claimed tax shelter deductions in
the 1980s and 1990s, obtained the tax advantages, promptly forgot
about their “investment”, and now realize that paying their taxes
may require a change of lifestyle.11
10(...continued)
acceptable.
11 Of course, the examples in the regulations are not meant
to be exhaustive, and petitioners’ situation is not identical to
that of the taxpayers in Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 714
(9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13, regarding whom the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that “no evidence
(continued...)
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