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issue.4 Because the MDA is silent as to whether Dr. Perkins’s
obligation under paragraph 14(f) of the MDA would have survived
petitioner’s death, the MDA itself does not resolve explicitly
the question of whether the fourth and final requirement of
section 71(b)(1) has been satisfied. As a consequence, we must
look to Tennessee law in order to properly characterize the
payments at issue in this case.
Under Tennessee law, two types of alimony are relevant in
this case: alimony in futuro and alimony in solido.5 The purpose
of alimony in futuro “is to provide financial support to a spouse
who cannot be rehabilitated.” Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465,
471 (Tenn. 2001). Alimony in futuro terminates “automatically
and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the
recipient” or upon the occurrence of a stated contingency, such
as a specific termination date. Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 36-5-
4 That is true because (1) those payments were received
under an MDA, (2) the MDA did not designate the payments as not
includable in gross income under sec. 71 and not allowable as a
deduction under sec. 215, and (3) petitioner and Dr. Perkins were
not members of the same household when the payments at issue were
made.
5 See Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 36-5-101 (2003); Burlew v.
Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Tenn. 2001). In 2005, Tenn. Code
Ann. sec. 36-5-101 was deleted in its entirety and replaced. The
deleted section was amended and recodified in Tenn Code Ann. sec.
36-5-121. In addition to alimony in futuro and alimony in
solido, Tennessee law provides for rehabilitative alimony and
transitional alimony, neither of which is relevant in this case
because they were not provided for in the MDA (transitional
alimony was not even introduced into the Tennessee Code until
2003, long after the parties entered into the MDA).
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