- 9 -
1983) (“The determining factor in distinguishing whether alimony
is in futuro or in solido is the definiteness or indefiniteness
of the amount ordered to be paid.”).
Because the Tennessee courts also look to the essential
purpose of the alimony award, see Self v. Self, supra at 362, we
will next address that issue. Our ultimate conclusion in that
regard, based largely on the relationship between paragraphs
14(a) and 14(f) of the MDA, is that the purpose of paragraph
14(f) was to oblige Dr. Perkins to pay alimony in futuro.
Robin Lyn Miller, an attorney who represented petitioner in
her divorce from Dr. Perkins, testified at trial that it was her
intent in negotiating the MDA that Dr. Perkins’s obligation under
paragraph 14(f) represent his obligation to pay petitioner for
her share of a marital asset. Attorney Miller further testified
that, if petitioner died before May 9, 2004, it was intended that
payments made by Dr. Perkins pursuant to paragraph 14(f) of the
MDA would have gone to petitioner’s estate. Upon
cross-examination, however, when asked whether it was just a
coincidence that Dr. Perkins’s obligation under paragraph 14(f)
of the MDA terminated on the same day as his obligation to pay
alimony in futuro--when petitioner reached the age of 59-1/2--
attorney Miller responded:
I don’t think -- it’s not coincidence. Certainly she
would have had a penalty to withdraw earlier. In
negotiating divorce cases, you have to -- I mean, these
are those odd asset[s] that may or may not come into
Page: Previous 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Next
Last modified: March 27, 2008