586
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,' " EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U. S., at 285).
Section 7(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
"Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce, as appropriate 3], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an 'agency action') is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h) of this section. . . ." 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2).
Nothing in this text indicates that the section applies in foreign countries.4 Indeed, the only geographic reference in
3 The ESA defines "Secretary" to mean "the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce as program responsibilities are vested pursuant to the provisions of Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970." 16 U. S. C. § 1532(15). As a general matter, "marine species are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce and all other species are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior." 51 Fed. Reg. 19926 (1986) (preamble to final regulations governing interagency consultation promulgated by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce).
4 Respondents point out that the duties in § 7(a)(2) are phrased in broad, inclusive language: "Each Federal agency" shall consult with the Secretary and ensure that "any action" does not jeopardize "any endangered or threatened species" or destroy or adversely modify the "habitat of such species." See Brief for Respondents 36; 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). The Court of Appeals correctly recognized, however, that such inclusive language, by itself, is not sufficient to overcome the presumption against the
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