502
Blackmun, J., dissenting
This case is one in which the statutory term in question should be read contextually, rather than under the assumption that the term necessarily has the same meaning in all contexts. The phrase "person entitled to compensation" is not defined in the statute, and it is susceptible of at least two interpretations—a "formalist" interpretation, according to which one may be entitled to compensation whether or not anyone ever acknowledges that fact, and a "positivist" or "legal realist" interpretation, according to which one is entitled to compensation only if the relevant decisionmaker has so declared. Which of these two senses is "correct" will depend upon context. The latter sense, I have suggested, is appropriate to a context in which liability for compensation is disputed and the employee is called upon to predict the future course of administrative and perhaps judicial proceedings—not just as to liability, but as to the precise amount of liability. And, in any event, I think, the text and circumstances of the 1984 amendment to § 33(g) indicate that Congress intended to adopt the "realist" interpretation found in O'Leary.
Moreover, the Court simply has failed to apply, or even mention, a maxim of interpretation, specifically applicable to the LHWCA, that strongly supports Cowart's position. This Court long has held that " '[t]his Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.' " Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 315- 316 (1983), quoting Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S., at 333. The only point at which the Court in this case consults the purposes of the Act is at the end of its opinion, when it assures the reader that its interpretation of the notification requirement of § 33(g)(2)—as opposed to its interpretation of the written-approval requirement stated in § 33(g)(1)—is consistent with the statute's purposes. See ante, at 482. Finally, underscoring its refusal to apply the maxim of liberal construction to this case, the Court ultimately acknowledges
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