Cite as: 506 U. S. 263 (1993)
Stevens, J., dissenting
those who oppose abortion and those who physically threaten women and obstruct their access to abortion clinics is also more than semantic. Petitioners in this case form a mob that seeks to impose a burden on women by forcibly preventing the exercise of a right that only women possess. The discriminatory effect of petitioners' conduct is beyond doubt.
Geduldig is inapplicable for another reason. The issue of class-based animus in this case arises in a statutory, not a constitutional, context. There are powerful reasons for giving § 1985(3) a reading that is broader than the constitutional holdings on which the Court relies.28 In our constitutional
difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy"); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 313-318 (1980). In Harris and Maher, the "suspect classification" that the Court considered was indigency. Relying on San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), the Court rejected the argument that "financial need alone identifies a suspect class." Maher, 432 U. S., at 471; Harris, 448 U. S., at 323 (citing Maher, 432 U. S., at 471).
28 A failure to meet the intent standard imposed on the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude a finding of class-based animus here. Much of this Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence concerns the permissibility of particular legislative distinctions. The case law that has evolved focuses on how impermissible discrimination may be inferred in the face of arguably "neutral" legislation or policy. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264-266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242 (1976). We have recognized that even in constitutional cases disproportionate impact may provide powerful evidence of discrimination. See Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279, n. 25; Arlington Heights, 429 U. S., at 265-266; Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. In developing the intent standard, though, we expressed reluctance to subject facially neutral legislation to judicial invalidation based on effect alone. The question here is not whether a law "neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue," Davis, 426 U. S., at 242, violates the Equal Protection Clause. It is indisputable that a governmental body would violate the Constitution if, for the purpose of burdening abortion, it infringed a person's federally protected right to travel. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 200 (1973). This governmental conduct would be
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