Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 72 (1993)

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334

BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH CLINIC

Stevens, J., dissenting

ments that discriminate against nonresidents. Instead, the Court broadly referred to the federal commerce power that "authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of individuals from violations of civil rights that impinge on their free movement in interstate commerce." 383 U. S., at 759. It then held that the right of interstate travel was one of the federal rights protected from private interference by the criminal statute that had been enacted as § 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 141, later codified at 18 U. S. C. § 241. That statute had previously been construed to contain a "stringent scienter requirement" to save it from condemnation as a criminal statute failing to provide adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. 383 U. S., at 785 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id., at 753-754. The Guest opinion then explained why this history would limit the coverage of 18 U. S. C. § 241:

"This does not mean, of course, that every criminal conspiracy affecting an individual's right of free interstate passage is within the sanction of 18 U. S. C. § 241. A specific intent to interfere with the federal right must be proved, and at a trial the defendants are entitled to a jury instruction phrased in those terms. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 106-107 [1945]. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not, of itself, violate § 241. But if the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right, then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in this case was brought." 383 U. S., at 760.

Today the Court assumes that the same sort of scienter requirement should apply to § 1985(3) because 18 U. S. C. § 241 is its "criminal counterpart." Ante, at 275.

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