Cite as: 506 U. S. 263 (1993)
Stevens, J., dissenting
The Court is mistaken. The criminal sanctions that were originally included in § 2 of the Ku Klux Act were held unconstitutional over a century ago. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (1883); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678 (1887). The statute now codified at 18 U. S. C. § 241 was enacted in 1870, a year earlier than the Ku Klux Act. The texts of the two statutes are materially different. Even if that were not so, it would be inappropriate to assume that a strict scienter requirement in a criminal statute should be glibly incorporated in a civil statute.32 But what is most significant is the dramatic difference between the language of 18 U. S. C. § 241, which includes an unequivocal "intent" requirement and the language of § 1985(3), which broadly describes a purpose to deprive another of a protected privilege "either directly or indirectly." An indirect interference with the right to travel may violate § 1985(3) even if it would not violate § 241.33
32 See, e. g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 436, and n. 13 (1978) (distinguishing intent requirement for civil and criminal violations of the Sherman Act).
33 The Court's confusion of the intent element of § 1985(3) with the intent required in criminal civil rights statutes is particularly surprising in that Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971), anticipated this mistake and explicitly warned against it. Indeed, Griffin expressly rejected the idea that § 1985(3) contained a specific intent requirement. In finding specific intent necessary for a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 241, United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966), relied on Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 106-107 (1945), which also construed a criminal statute, 18 U. S. C. § 241, to require specific intent. See Guest, 383 U. S., at 760. Griffin unmistakably distinguished that kind of specific intent requirement from the mental element required for a claim under § 1985(3). In Griffin the Court stated that the "motivation requirement" of § 1985(3) "must not be confused with the test of 'specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law' articulated by the plurality opinion in Screws v. United States . . . ." 403 U. S., at 102, n. 10. The language could hardly be more clear. Griffin took care to differentiate between "invidiously discriminatory animus," which § 1985(3) did require, and specific intent to violate a right, which § 1985(3) did not. Further, while distinguishing Screws, Griffin cited Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), which declined
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