Cite as: 514 U. S. 549 (1995)
Thomas, J., concurring
post, at 625 (Breyer, J.) (quoting North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686, 705 (1946)). Even though the boundary between commerce and other matters may ignore "economic reality" and thus seem arbitrary or artificial to some, we must nevertheless respect a constitutional line that does not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.
III
If the principal dissent's understanding of our early case law were correct, there might be some reason to doubt this view of the original understanding of the Constitution. According to that dissent, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), established that Congress may control all local activities that "significantly affect interstate commerce," post, at 615. And, "with the exception of one wrong turn subsequently corrected," this has been the "traditiona[l]" method of interpreting the Commerce Clause. Post, at 631 (citing Gibbons and United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941)).
In my view, the dissent is wrong about the holding and reasoning of Gibbons. Because this error leads the dissent to characterize the first 150 years of this Court's case law as a "wrong turn," I feel compelled to put the last 50 years in proper perspective.
A
In Gibbons, the Court examined whether a federal law that licensed ships to engage in the "coasting trade" preempted a New York law granting a 30-year monopoly to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton to navigate the State's waterways by steamship. In concluding that it did, the Court noted that Congress could regulate "navigation" because "[a]ll America . . . has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed." 9 Wheat., at 190. The Court also ob-
593
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