Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
Finally, classification of the time at issue here as on-duty time would impose on railroads the very scheduling problems that Congress sought to avoid when it created limbo time as a compromise during the 1969 HSA amendment process. Petitioner unions' attempts to treat the time at issue as on-duty time under §§ 21103(b)(5), 21103(b)(1), and 21103(b)(3) are unpersuasive, as are the cases that they cite, all of which were decided before the 1969 amendments. Pp. 156-162. 44 F. 3d 437, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Lawrence M. Mann argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Harold A. Ross and Clinton J. Miller III.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, John F. Daly, Paul M. Geier, and Daniel Carey Smith. Ronald M. Johnson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company et al.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to resolve a division between two Courts of Appeals regarding the correct statutory classification, under the Hours of Service Act, 49 U. S. C. § 21101 et seq., of the time that train employees spend waiting for transportation at the end of their shift.
I
Congress enacted the Hours of Service Act (HSA) in 1907. Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, § 1, 34 Stat. 1415. The HSA's purpose is to promote railroad safety by limiting the number of hours a train crew may remain on duty and by requiring
*John H. Broadley, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Robert W. Blanchette, and James C. Schultz filed a brief for the Association of American Railroads as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
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