Cite as: 516 U. S. 152 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
portation is followed not by renewed service but by the statutory off-duty rest time. Petitioners next argue that because the HSA provides that "[t]ime on duty begins when the employee reports for duty and ends when the employee is finally released from duty," § 21103(b)(1), time on duty must always continue until the employee reaches his designated terminal. But that cannot be, for the HSA is express in providing that deadhead transportation from a duty site is limbo time, § 21103(b)(4).
Petitioners also point to § 21103(b)(3), which classifies as on duty any "[t]ime spent performing any other service for the railroad carrier during the 24-hour period in which the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train." They say that because employees may be required to perform services for the railroad while they wait for the deadhead transportation to arrive, waiting time must be considered time on duty pursuant to § 21103(b)(3). Petitioners' argument begs the question, however. If employees are required to perform services covered by § 21103(b)(3), the time is on-duty time by definition. The question presented here, however, is how to treat the time spent waiting for deadhead transportation when no additional services are required, and § 21103(b)(3) cannot answer that question.
Petitioners, like the Ninth Circuit in United Transportation Union v. Skinner, 975 F. 2d, at 1426, point to numerous cases, most of them decided during the early part of this century, that they believe support their interpretation of the statute. See Missouri, K., & T. R. Co. of Tex. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112 (1913); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 220 F. 108 (CA9 1915); United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 F. 722 (CA9 1917); United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 275 F. Supp. 345 (WD Pa. 1967); United States v. Chicago, M. & P. S. R. Co., 195 F. 783 (WD Wash. 1912). We need not determine whether the Ninth Circuit's reading of these cases was the correct one, cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Peña, 44 F. 3d 437, 444 (CA7 1994) (opinion below)
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