156
Opinion of the Court
present action, seeking direct review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of the FRA's order changing its interpretation. A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the FRA's order, see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Peña, 29 F. 3d 324 (1994), but that opinion was superseded when the Seventh Circuit took the case en banc, 44 F. 3d 437 (1994). The en banc court rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that time spent waiting for deadhead transportation is limbo time.
Because of the importance of uniform nationwide application of the HSA's regulatory scheme, we granted certiorari. 515 U. S. 1141 (1995).
II
In determining how time spent waiting for deadhead transportation should be classified, we begin with the text and design of the statute. As first enacted, the HSA divided all time into two categories—on duty and off duty—but it did not define either term. Congress amended the HSA in 1969, reducing the number of permissible on-duty hours and providing some specific rules for determining if a given period of time should be considered on duty or off duty. These statutory provisions are the controlling guide in the case before us, and are as follows:
"(1) Time on duty begins when the employee reports for duty and ends when the employee is finally released from duty.
"(2) Time the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty.
"(3) Time spent performing any other service for the railroad carrier during a 24-hour period in which the employee is engaged in or connected with the movement of a train is time on duty.
"(4) Time spent in deadhead transportation to a duty assignment is time on duty, but time spent in deadhead
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