Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 13 (1996) (per curiam)

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Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996)

Stevens, J., concurring

ment's narrow self-interest. And the Government has informed us that it intends to apply that interpretation to future cases nationwide. Giving Lawrence a chance to benefit from it furthers fairness by treating Lawrence like other future benefits applicants. We acknowledge the dissent's concern that postlitigation interpretations may be the product of unfair or manipulative Government litigating strategies, see post, at 187, and we therefore view late changes of position by the Government with some skepticism. That general concern does not, however, appear to us to require that we deprive Lawrence of the benefit of a favorable administrative reinterpretation in these particular circumstances. We believe, therefore, that the equities and legal uncertainties of this case together merit a GVR order.2

Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the position taken in the brief for respondent filed by the Solicitor General, August 17, 1995.

Justice Stevens, concurring.*

The Court persuasively explains why we have "the power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue that is properly before us in our appellate capacity." Ante, at 166. That conclusion comports with a primary characteristic—and, I believe, virtue—of our discretionary authority to manage our certiorari docket: our ability to

2 In a letter filed on October 24, 1995, the Solicitor General advised this Court of a July 1995 amendment to the North Carolina paternity statute, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 49-14(c). We find it unnecessary to decide whether this development independently justifies our GVR order. The Court of Appeals is free to consider its significance on remand.

*[This opinion applies also to No. 94-8988, Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193.]

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