Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 17 (1996) (per curiam)

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Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996)

Scalia, J., dissenting

and agents of this body—as are masters, whose work we may reject and send back for redoing at our own pleasure. Inferior courts are separately authorized in the Constitution, see Art. I, § 8; Art. III, § 1, created by Acts of Congress, see, e. g., Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73; Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, and staffed by judges whose manner of appointment and tenure of office are the same as our own, see U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2; Art. III, § 1; 28 U. S. C. §§ 44, 133, 134. Despite the unqualified language of § 2106, we cannot, for example, "reverse" a judgment of one of these courts "and direct the entry" of a different judgment whenever we disagree with what has been done, but only when we can identify a controlling error of law. And I think we cannot "vacate" and "remand" in the circumstances here.

The Court today seeks to portray our no-fault V&R practice as traditionally covering a kaleidoscopic diversity of situations. See Lawrence v. Chater, ante, at 166-167. That is in my view a misportrayal; the practice has always been limited to a few discrete categories of cases. It began, apparently, in situations calling forth the special deference owed to state law and state courts in our system of federalism. In Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 273 U. S. 126 (1927), for example, rather than find error on the basis of the federal constitutional claims raised, this Court set aside the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings so that it could consider the meaning and effect of a state statute that had been enacted after its judgment had been entered. We reasoned that "[w]hile this Court may decide these [state-law] questions, it is not obliged to do so, and in view of their nature, we deem it appropriate to refer the determination to the state court." Id., at 131. In other words, we left it to the state court to decide the effect of the intervening event, rather than follow our usual practice of deciding that question for ourselves, see, e. g., Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450, 456-458 (1865). See generally United

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