Cite as: 516 U. S. 163 (1996)
Scalia, J., dissenting
iting the function of pronouncing 'the last word on every important issue under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States.' A Supreme Court, on the other hand, should not be a tribunal obligated to weigh justice among contesting parties.
" 'They have had all they have a right to claim,' Taft said, 'when they have had two courts in which to have adjudicated their controversy.' " 2 H. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 997-998 (1939).
I agree with the decision announced in the per curiam to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in No. 94-9323, Lawrence v. Chater. Whether or not the change of position by the Social Security Administration is "cognizable," in the words of Justice Scalia, post, at 187, it is perfectly reasonable to request the Court of Appeals to answer that question in the first instance.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.*
I dissent because I believe that the dispositions in both No. 94-8988, post, p. 193, and No. 94-9323, ante, p. 163, are improper extensions of our limited power to vacate without first finding error below.
It sometimes occurs that, after having considered the lower court decision and found error, an appellate court merely reverses or vacates and then remands—that is, it sets the judgment aside and sends the case back to the lower court for further proceedings, rather than entering or directing entry of judgment for the appellant or petitioner. That is the appropriate course whenever the finding of error does not automatically entitle the appellant or petitioner to judgment, and the appellate court cannot conduct (or chooses not to conduct) the further inquiry necessary to resolve the ques-*[This opinion applies also to No. 94-8988, Stutson v. United States, post, p. 193.]
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