178
Scalia, J., dissenting
tions remaining in the litigation. Our books are full of such cases, from Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6 (1794), and Clarke v. Russel, 3 Dall. 415 (1799), to Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 (1995), and Tuggle v. Netherland, ante, p. 10.
What is at issue here, however, is a different sort of creature, which might be called "no-fault V&R": vacation of a judgment and remand without any determination of error in the judgment below. In our discretionary certiorari system of review, such an order has acquired the acronym "GVR"— for the Court grants certiorari, vacates the judgment below, and remands for further proceedings.1 The question presented by today's cases is whether there is any limitation (other than the mandate "do what is fair") upon this practice. The Court's per curiam opinions answer "no"; I disagree.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 2106 provides that "[t]he Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances." This facially unlimited statutory text is subject to the implicit limitations imposed by traditional practice and by the nature of the appellate system created by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The inferior federal courts (to say nothing of state courts) are not the creatures
1 I emphasize that what is at issue here is our power to set aside a valid judgment—not, as Justice Stevens' concurrence would have it, "our discretionary authority to manage our certiorari docket." Ante, at 175. We do the latter by accepting or declining review. But "[w]henever this Court grants certiorari and vacates a court of appeals judgment in order to allow that court to reconsider its decision . . . , the Court is acting on the merits." Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 25-26 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, today's orders go far beyond what Justice Stevens now refers to as "administration of [our certiorari] docket." Ante, at 176.
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