Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 10 (1997)

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Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997)

Opinion of the Court

case when he was injured, so that he was a "person entitled to compensation" and required to obtain his employer's approval at the time he entered into the settlement agreement. Ibid.

With Cowart and the plain language of § 33(g) in mind, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether Mrs. Yates satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining death benefits under the Act at the time she signed the releases contained in the predeath settlements. Section 9 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 909(b), governs the distribution of death benefits, and provides that a "widow or widower" is entitled to such benefits "[i]f the [employee's] injury causes death." See also § 902(11) (defining "death" as a basis for a right to compensation as "death resulting from an injury"); § 902(2) (defining "injury" as "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment"). The Act defines a "widow or widower" as "the decedent's wife or husband living with or dependent for support upon him or her at the time of his or her death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his or her desertion at such time." § 902(16).

Taken together, these statutes indicate that a surviving spouse qualifies for death benefits only if: (i) the survivor's deceased worker-spouse dies from a work-related injury; (ii) the survivor is married to the worker-spouse at the time of the worker-spouse's death; and (iii) the survivor is either living with the worker-spouse, dependent upon the worker-spouse, or living apart from the worker-spouse because of desertion or other justifiable cause at the time of the worker-spouse's death. Cf. Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U. S. 334, 336 (1954) (looking to status of spouse at time of death to determine whether spouse is a "widow" or "widower" for purposes of LHWCA). It is impossible to ascertain whether these prerequisites have been met at any time prior to the death of the injured worker. Accord, Cortner v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 22 BRBS 218, 220 (1989) ("It is not until death occurs that the right to benefits arises and the potential ben-

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