Cite as: 519 U. S. 248 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
This is a question we have yet to decide, and is one we leave for another day. If, for the sake of argument, we assumed that Ingalls' proposition were correct, our conclusion on the question presented in this case would not change. We agree that the Act generally reflects a policy of avoiding double recovery. See 33 U. S. C. § 903(e). But § 903(e) is of fairly recent vintage, Pub. L. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1640; E. P. Paup Co. v. Director, OWCP, 999 F. 2d 1341, 1350 (CA9 1993) ("Prior to [enactment of] section 903(e), the credit doctrine allowed offset of benefits against LHWCA awards only if prior benefits were awarded under the LHWCA") (emphasis added), and its reach is not all inclusive. See, e. g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 848 F. 2d 125 (CA9 1998) (allowing double recovery of veterans disability benefits and LHWCA benefits); Brown v. Forest Oil Corp., 29 F. 3d 966, 971 (CA5 1994) ("Although admittedly the LHWCA has a general policy to avoid double recoveries, we have also noted that limitations on employee recovery are not favored absent statutory authority") (footnote omitted). Because the prohibition against double recovery is not absolute, we do not find the possibility of such recovery in this context to be so absurd or glaringly unjust as to warrant a departure from the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484 (1984) (plain language controls unless it leads to results that are " 'absurd or glaringly unjust' "). Furthermore, as Ingalls acknowledges, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 13, subrogation under the Act is not an employer's exclusive remedy against third parties responsible for employees' injuries; an employer in Ingalls' position would remain free to seek indemnification against a third party through a tort action in state or federal court. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U. S. 529, 538 (1983); Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U. S. 404, 412-414 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that before an injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to compensation" for death benefits within the meaning of
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