260
Opinion of the Court
to compensation" recovers from third parties. 33 U. S. C. § 933(f) ("If the person entitled to compensation institutes proceedings . . . the employer shall be required to pay as compensation under this chapter a sum equal to the excess of the amount which the Secretary determines is payable on account of such injury or death over the net amount recovered against such third person"). If, as Ingalls asserts, the phrase "person entitled to compensation" means the same thing under § 33(f) as it does under § 33(g), see Cowart, supra, at 479, then our holding today means that an employer would not be permitted to reduce the spouse's death benefits by any amounts the spouse receives from predeath settlements. Such a spouse would be able to recover once from the third party and again from the worker's employer under the Act after the worker's death. In effect, a spouse in this situation—unlike a spouse who entered into settlements the day after the worker dies—would receive double recovery for her injuries. This double recovery, Ingalls contends, contravenes one of the central tenets of the Act set forth in § 3(e), 33 U. S. C. § 903(e), of the Act: "[A]ny amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers' compensation law or section 688 of title 46, Appendix (relating to recovery for injury to or death of seamen), shall be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter." See also Cowart, supra, at 483 (noting that the Act "ensures against fraudulent double recovery by the employee"); 2A A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 71.21 (1996) ("[T]he policy of avoiding double recovery is a strong one . . ."). In Ingalls' view, our reading of the statute gives a "potential widow . . . greater benefits and protections than that afforded to covered employees who settle their third party claims." Brief for Petitioners 22-23.
This entire argument, however, presupposes that the definition we today give to "person entitled to compensation" under § 33(g) applies without qualification to § 33(f) as well.
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