Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 9 (1999)

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Cite as: 527 U. S. 373 (1999)

Opinion of the Court

Petitioner's argument is based on his construction of the term "[o]therwise." He argues that this term means that when the jury, after retiring for deliberations, reports itself as unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the sentencing determination passes to the court.

As the dissent also concludes, post, at 417-418, petitioner's view of the statute is the better one. The phrase "good cause" in § 3593(b)(2)(C) plainly encompasses events such as juror disqualification, but cannot be read so expansively as to include the jury's failure to reach a unanimous decision. Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment does not require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree.

To be sure, we have said that the Eighth Amendment requires that a sentence of death not be imposed arbitrarily. See, e. g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269, 275 (1998). In order for a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, it must perform a narrowing function with respect to the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry. Ibid. The instruction that petitioner requested has no bearing on what we have called the "eligibility phase" of the capital sentencing process. As for what we have called the "selection phase," our cases have held that in order to satisfy the requirement that capital sentencing decisions rest upon an individualized inquiry, a scheme must allow a "broad inquiry" into all "constitution-ally relevant mitigating evidence." Id., at 276. Petitioner does not argue, nor could he, that the District Court's failure to give the requested instruction prevented the jury from considering such evidence.

In theory, the District Court's failure to instruct the jury as to the consequences of deadlock could give rise to an Eighth Amendment problem of a different sort: We also have held that a jury cannot be "affirmatively misled regarding its

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