Cite as: 527 U. S. 373 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
We similarly decline to exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction on the consequences of deadlock be given in every capital case. In drafting the Act, Congress chose not to require such an instruction. Cf. § 3593(f) (district court "shall instruct the jury that, in considering whether a sentence of death is justified, it shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim and that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim may be"). Petitioner does point us to a decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court requiring, in an exercise of that court's supervisory authority, that the jury be informed of the sentencing consequences of nonunanimity. See New Jersey v. Ramseur, 106 N. J. 123, 304-315, 524 A. 2d 188, 280-286 (1987). Of course, New Jersey's practice has no more relevance to our decision than the power to persuade. Several other States have declined to require a similar instruction. See, e. g., North Carolina v. McCarver, 341 N. C. 364, 394, 462 S. E. 2d 25, 42 (1995); Brogie v. Oklahoma, 695 P. 2d 538, 547 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Calhoun v. Maryland, 297 Md. 563, 593-595, 468 A. 2d 45, 58-60 (1983); Coulter v. Alabama, 438 So. 2d 336, 346 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Justus v. Virginia, 220 Va. 971, 979, 266 S. E. 2d 87, 92-93 (1980). We find the reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court in Justus far more persuasive than that of the New Jersey Supreme Court, especially in light of the strong governmental interest that we have recognized in having the jury render a unanimous sentence recommendation:
(CA6 1998); Green v. French, 143 F. 3d 865, 890 (CA4 1998); United States v. Chandler, 996 F. 2d 1073, 1088-1089 (CA11 1993); Evans v. Thompson, 881 F. 2d 117, 123-124 (CA4 1989). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, in the alternative, reached the same conclusion in this very case. See 132 F. 3d 232, 245 (1998).
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