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Opinion of the Court
role in the sentencing process." Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1, 9 (1994). In no way, however, was the jury affirmatively misled by the District Court's refusal to give petition-er's proposed instruction. The truth of the matter is that the proposed instruction has no bearing on the jury's role in the sentencing process. Rather, it speaks to what happens in the event that the jury is unable to fulfill its role—when deliberations break down and the jury is unable to produce a unanimous sentence recommendation. Petitioner's argument, although less than clear, appears to be that a death sentence is arbitrary within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if the jury is not given any bit of information that might possibly influence an individual juror's voting behavior. That contention has no merit. We have never suggested, for example, that the Eighth Amendment requires a jury be instructed as to the consequences of a breakdown in the deliberative process. On the contrary, we have long been of the view that "[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves." Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492, 501 (1896).5 We further have recognized that in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has "a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death." Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 238 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We are of the view that a charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest.6
5 We have thus approved of the use of a supplemental charge to encourage a jury reporting itself as deadlocked to engage in further deliberations, see Allen v. United States, 164 U. S., at 501, even capital sentencing juries, see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 237-241 (1988).
6 It is not insignificant that the Courts of Appeals to have addressed this question, as far as we are aware, are uniform in rejecting the argument that the Constitution requires an instruction as to the consequences of a jury's inability to agree. See, e. g., Coe v. Bell, 161 F. 3d 320, 339-340
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