Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 16 (1999)

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388

JONES v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

takes before the jury retires and in that way help to avoid the burdens of an unnecessary retrial. While an objection in a directed verdict motion before the jury retires can preserve a claim of error, Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 32 (1969), objections raised after the jury has completed its deliberations do not. See Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 38 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 436 (1963); cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 238-239 (1940). Nor does a request for an instruction before the jury retires preserve an objection to the instruction actually given by the court. Otherwise, district judges would have to speculate on what sorts of objections might be implied through a request for an instruction and issue rulings on "implied" objections that a defendant never intends to raise. Such a rule would contradict Rule 30's mandate that a party state distinctly his grounds for objection.

Petitioner did not voice the objections to the instructions and decision forms that he now raises before the jury retired. See App. 16-33. While Rule 30 could be read literally to bar any review of petitioner's claim of error, our decisions instead have held that an appellate court may conduct a limited review for plain error. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b); Johnson v. United States, 520 U. S. 461, 465-466 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 731-732 (1993); Lopez, supra, at 436-437; Namet v. United States, 373 U. S. 179, 190-191 (1963). Petitioner, however, contends that the Federal Death Penalty Act creates an exception. He relies on language in the Act providing that an appellate court shall remand a case where it finds that "the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." § 3595(c)(2)(A). According to petitioner, the alleged jury confusion over the available sentencing options is an arbitrary factor and thus warrants resentencing even if he did not properly preserve the objection.

This argument rests on an untenable reading of the Act. The statute does not explicitly announce an exception to

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