Cite as: 528 U. S. 377 (2000)
Thomas, J., dissenting
nore that a contribution, by amplifying the voice of the candidate, helps to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey. Absent the ability to rest on the denigration of contributions as mere "proxy speech," the arguments fall apart.3
The decision of individuals to speak through contributions rather than through independent expenditures is entirely reasonable.4 Political campaigns are largely candidate fo-3 If one were to accept the speech-by-proxy point and consider a contribution a mere symbolic gesture, Buckley's auxiliary arguments still falter. The claim that a large contribution receives less protection because it only expresses the "intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) (quoted ante, at 386), fails under our jurisprudence because we have accorded full First Amendment protection to expressions of intensity. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (protecting the use of an obscenity to stress a point). Equally unavailing is the claim that a contribution warrants less protection because it "does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 21 (quoted ante, at 386). We regularly hold that speech is protected when the underlying basis for a position is not given. See, e. g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 46 (1994) (sign reading "For Peace in the Gulf"); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 510-511 (1969) (black armband signifying opposition to Vietnam war). See also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 640 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) ("Even a pure message of support, unadorned with reasons, is valuable to the democratic process"). Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 569 (1995) (opinion of the Court by Souter, J.) ("[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection").
4 Justice Stevens asserts that "[m]oney is property; it is not speech," ante, at 398 (concurring opinion), and contends that there is no First Amendment right "to hire mercenaries" and "to hire gladiators," ante, at 399. These propositions are directly contradicted by many of our precedents. For example, in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U. S. 414 (1988) (opinion of the Court by Stevens, J.), this Court confronted a state ban on payments to petition circulators. The District Court upheld the law, finding that the ban on monetary payments did not restrain expression and that the
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