Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 42 (2000)

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418

NIXON v. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC

Thomas, J., dissenting

speech. By depriving donors of their right to speak through the candidate, contribution limits relegate donors' points of view to less effective modes of communication. Additionally, limiting contributions curtails individual participation. "Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or standing in front of one's house with a hand-held sign may make the difference between participating and not participating in some public debate." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 57 (1994) (opinion of the Court by Stevens, J.). Buckley completely failed in its attempt to provide a basis for permitting government to second-guess the individual choices of citizens partaking in quint-essentially democratic activities. "The First Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the government, know best both what they want to say and how to say it." Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 790-791 (1988).

B

The Court in Buckley denigrated the speech interests not only of contributors, but also of candidates. Although the Court purported to be concerned about the plight of candidates, it nevertheless proceeded to disregard their interests without justification. The Court did not even attempt to claim that contribution limits do not suppress the speech of political candidates. See 424 U. S., at 18 ("[C]ontribution . . . limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by . . . candidates"); id., at 33 ("[T]he [contribution] limitations may have a significant effect on particular challengers or incumbents"). It could not have, given the reality that donations "mak[e] a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the

58 (1973). "For even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty." Id., at 58-59.

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