Cite as: 528 U. S. 377 (2000)
Thomas, J., dissenting
discourse by giving rather than spending, if the donee is able to put the funds to more productive use than can the individual." Colorado Republican, 518 U. S., at 636 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 261 (1986) ("[I]ndividuals contribute to a political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own personal direction").5
In the end, Buckley's claim that contribution limits "d[o] not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues," 424 U. S., at 21 (quoted ante, at 387), ignores the distinct role of candidate organizations as a means of individual participation in the Nation's civic dialogue.6 The result is simply the suppression of political
5 Even if contributions to a candidate were not the most effective means of speaking—and contribution caps left political speech "significantly un-impaired," ante, at 387—an individual's choice of that mode of expression would still be protected. "The First Amendment protects [individuals'] right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing." Meyer, supra, at 424 (opinion of the Court by Stevens, J.). See also Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457, 488 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting a "First Amendment interest in touting [one's] wares as he sees fit").
6 Buckley's approach to associational freedom is also unsound. In defense of its decision, the Court in Buckley explained that contribution limits "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates." 424 U. S., at 22 (quoted ante, at 387). In essence, the Court accepted contribution limits because alternative channels of association remained open. This justification, however, is peculiar because we have rejected the notion that a law will pass First Amendment muster simply because it leaves open other opportunities. Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 411, n. 4 (1974) (per curiam) (Although a prohibition's effect may be " 'minuscule and trifling,' " a person " 'is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place' " (quoting Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939))). See also, e. g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 416, n. 11 (1989); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51,
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