Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 46 (2000)

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422

NIXON v. SHRINK MISSOURI GOVERNMENT PAC

Thomas, J., dissenting

when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be said").

Unfortunately, the majority does not stop with a revision of Buckley's labels. After hiding behind Buckley's discredited reasoning and invoking "Buckley's standard of scrutiny," ante, at 387, the Court proceeds to significantly extend the holding in that case. The Court's substantive departure from Buckley begins with a revision of our compelling-interest jurisprudence. In Buckley, the Court indicated that the only interest that could qualify as "compelling" in this area was the government's interest in reducing actual and apparent corruption.8 424 U. S., at 25-26. And the Court repeatedly used the word "corruption" in the narrow quid pro quo sense, meaning "[p]erversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour." 3 Oxford English Dictionary 974 (2d ed. 1989). See also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 512 (1976) ("inducement (as of a political official) by means of improper considerations (as bribery) to commit a violation of duty"). When the Court set forth the interest in preventing actual corruption, it spoke about "large contributions . . . given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 26. The Court used similar language when it set forth the interest in protecting against the appearance of corruption: "Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial con-8 The Court in Buckley explicitly rejected two other proffered rationales for campaign finance regulation as out of tune with the First Amendment: equalization of the ability of citizens to affect the outcome of elections and controlling the costs of campaigns. See 424 U. S., at 48-49 (governmen-tally imposed equalization measures are "wholly foreign to the First Amendment"); id., at 57 (mounting costs of elections "provid[e] no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign spending").

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