Cite as: 532 U. S. 706 (2001)
Syllabus
(1) exercise 1 of 12 listed supervisory functions, including "responsibly direct[ing]" other employees, (2) use "independent judgment" in exercising their authority, and (3) hold their authority in the employer's interest, § 2(11). The Board rejected respondent's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use "independent judgment" under § 2(11) when they exercise "ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards." Brief for Petitioner 11. This interpretation, by distinguishing different kinds of judgment, introduces a categorical exclusion into statutory text that does not suggest its existence. The text permits questions regarding the degree of discretion an employee exercises, but the Board's interpretation renders determinative factors that have nothing to do with degree: even a significant judgment only loosely constrained by the employer will not be independent if it is "professional or technical." The Board limits its categorical exclusion with a qualifier that is no less striking: only professional judgment applied in directing less skilled employees to deliver services is not "independent judgment." Hence, the exclusion would apply to only 1 of the listed supervisory functions—"responsibly to direct"—though all 12 require using independent judgment. Contrary to the Board's contention, Congress did not incorporate the Board's categorical restrictions on "independent judgment" when it first added "supervisor" to the Act in 1947. The Board's policy concern regarding the proper balance of labor-management power cannot be given effect through this statutory text. Because this Court may not enforce the Board's order by applying a legal standard the Board did not adopt, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 289- 290, the Board's error precludes the Court from enforcing its order. Pp. 712-722.
193 F. 3d 444, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 722.
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Waxman, Matthew D. Roberts, Leonard R. Page, John H. Ferguson, Norton J. Come, and John Emad Arbab. Thomas J. Schulz, Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, and
707
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