710
Opinion of the Court
NLRB, 401 U. S. 137, 139-141 (1971) (approving that practice); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146, 161-162 (1941) (same).
Respondent petitioned for review of the Board's decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the Board cross-petitioned. The Sixth Circuit granted respondent's petition as it applied to the nurses and refused to enforce the bargaining order. It held that the Board had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on respondent rather than on its General Counsel, and it rejected the Board's interpretation of "independent judgment," explaining that the Board had erred by classifying "the practice of a nurse supervising a nurse's aide in administering patient care" as " 'routine' [simply] because the nurses have the ability to direct patient care by virtue of their training and expertise, not because of their connection with 'management.' " 193 F. 3d 444, 453 (1999). We granted the Board's petition for a writ of certiorari. 530 U. S. 1304 (2000).
II
The Act expressly defines the term "supervisor" in § 2(11), which provides:
"The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." 29 U. S. C. § 152(11).
The Act does not, however, expressly allocate the burden of proving or disproving a challenged employee's supervisory status. The Board therefore has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that the burden is borne by
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