Interference No. 104,192 Cragg v. Martin v. Fogarty each of Fogarty’s claims 27-69 does not define the same patentable invention as any of Cragg’s claims and Martin claims whose correspondence to the count is not disputed by Cragg. Cragg’s arguments with regard to designating Fogarty’s claims as not corresponding to the count is merely a reference to its arguments alleging no interference-in-fact between Cragg’s claims and Fogarty’s claims. Cragg evidently is of the view that if it has demonstrated no interference-in-fact between its claims and Martin’s claims on the one hand and Fogarty’s claims on the other hand, then the case has been made that Fogarty’s claims corresponding to the count should be designated as not corresponding to the count. But Cragg has failed to demonstrate no interference-in-fact between its claims and Martin’s claims on the one hand and Fogarty’s claims on the other hand. Thus, no reason has been shown to designate Fogarty’s claims 27-69 as not corresponding to the count. Note also that even if there was no interference-in- fact with respect to any Fogarty claim, Fogarty’s application would become uninvolved and there would be no need to designate any of its claims as not corresponding to the count. For the foregoing reasons, Cragg has shown no error in - 95 -Page: Previous 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007