Interference No. 104,693
Preputnick v. Provencher
contacts" inasmuch as the first contacts in the Sasaki patent are
of a differ.ent configuration as the second contacts in the Sasaki
patent. But the fact that the first and second contacts in the
Sasaki patent are different in configuration does not mean that
all first and second contacts, wherever found, must always have
different structure and configuration. The gap in logic is huge.
The fact that the two cars of A's family are of different make
and model does not mean the two cars of B's family must also be
different from each other.
If Provencher wanted to limit its claims so that the first
and second contacts are of different type, it easily could have
added the word 'type" or ękind" to the claim. If it does not
want to so limit its claim, then it validly would not add the
limiting term ętype" or ękind." If Preputnick's view is adopted,
Provencher would have to add to its claim 17 the lengthy
narrative 'said first and second contacts may or may not have the
same structure and configuration" to set forth a broader scope.
That is both unreasonable and unnecessary. Merely stating 'first
and second contacts" does the job.
Preputnick's motion cites to Paragraph 37 of the declaration
of Richard F. Granitz for.support. That paragraph of the
declaration states as 'follows:
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