Interference 103,781
every limitation of that claim. Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353,
359, 224 USPQ 857, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Moreover, “[c]onception
must be proved by corroborating evidence which shows that the
inventor disclosed to others his ‘complete thought expressed in
such clear terms as to enable those skilled in the art’ to make
the invention.” Id. at 359, 224 USPQ at 862 (quoting Field v.
Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 601, 86 USPQ 373, 379 (CCPA 1950)).
Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 26 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
explained the requirement at 1194, 26 USPQ2d at 1036-37 (quoting
Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264, 278-79 (D.C. Cir.
1897)):
[C]onception by an inventor, for the purpose of
establishing priority, can not be proved by his mere
allegation nor by his unsupported testimony where there
has been no disclosure to others or embodiment of the
invention in some clearly perceptible form, such as
drawings or model, with sufficient proof of identity
in point of time. For otherwise[,] such facile means
of establishing priority of invention would, in many
cases, offer great temptation to perjury, and would have
the effect of virtually precluding the adverse party
from the possibility of rebutting such evidence.
However, the “rule of reason” applies. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d
at 1195, 26 USPQ2d at 1037. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d at 1196,
26 USPQ2d at 1038, instructs:
[A]ll of the evidence put forth . . . must be considered
as a whole, not individually, in determining . . .
[conception]. In other words, an inventor can conceivably
prove prior conception by clear and convincing evidence
although no one piece of evidence in and of itself
establishes prior conception. It is sufficient if the
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